Counterinsurgency warfare: theory and practice / David Galula; Foreword by John A. David Galula drank as deeply of this bitter draught as did his contempo -. Counterinsurgency Warfare provides the template for the defeat of today’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Front Cover. David Galula. This volume in the Praeger Security International (PSI) series Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era defines the laws of insurgency and outlines the strategy and.

Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read.

Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice

Want to Read saving…. Want to Read Currently Reading Read. Refresh and try again. Open Preview See a Problem? Thanks for telling us about the problem. Return to Book Page. Preview — Counterinsurgency Warfare by David Galula. Theory and Practice by David Galula.

Summary of “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice” | Beyond Intractability

This volume in the Praeger Security International PSI series Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era defines the laws of insurgency and outlines the strategy and tactics to combat such threats.

Drawn from the observations of a French officer, David Galula, who witnessed guerrilla counternsurgency on three continents, the book remains relevant today as American policymakers, militar This volume in the Praeger Security International PSI series Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era defines the laws of insurgency and outlines the strategy and tactics to combat such threats.

Drawn from the observations of a French officer, David Galula, who witnessed guerrilla warfare on three continents, the book remains relevant today as Waarfare policymakers, military analysts, xavid members of the public look to the counterinsurgency era of the s for lessons to apply to the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan.

With a new foreword by John A. Paperbackpages. Published August 30th by Praeger Security International first published To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. To ask other readers questions about Counterinsurgency Warfareplease sign up.

Be the first to ask a question about Counterinsurgency Warfare. Lists with This Book. Short, lucid, clear how-to manual on defeating insurgencies. Written inbut remains sound from everything I have read on the subject. Describes the clear-hold-build strategy eventually counterinsjrgency successfully in Iraq though not by that exact name. Belongs in every counterinsurgent’s backpack.

An insurgency can only succeed by building on the population’s real grievances. A counterinsurgency can only succeed by winning the support of the people. Thus, the objective of the conflict is the peop Short, lucid, clear how-to manual on defeating insurgencies. Thus, the objective of the conflict is the people.

Military action is secondary to political action. The war is won or lost at the company level, where falula leader is in direct and continuous contact with the population. Sep 04, Caitlin rated it it was amazing. I have been doing some studying up on warfare and counterinsurgency warfare in particular, and this is one the most basic and essential texts on the subject. Reading counterinsutgency, so much of what Galula talks about seems so obvious now, but ocunterinsurgency only stands as evidence of how seminal a book it is in the field.

There is plenty in it to make one wonder why the U. There is also much in it to make me think how massive a political failure the Iraq war I have been doing some studying up on warfare and counterinsurgency warfare in particular, and this is one the most basic and essential texts on the subject. There is warfade much in it to gaalula me think how massive a political failure the Iraq war – and to a good extent, the war in Afghanistan as well – represents.

Galula warns strongly multiple times of the dangers of having soldiers do any job that should daviid to civilians for any extended length of time.

And yet, in these wars, the civilians barely showed. The military, by all evidence, seems to have been more flexible and creative than our civilian agencies, with better leadership.

I’m actually quite surprised- because I have long since learned that anything trendy usually sucks, I was not expecting much from this book. In addition, I have read many other books on this subject over the last couple of decades.

I have to admit, however, that ‘Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Lieutenant Colonel Galula’s reputation, which I had I’m actually quite surprised- because I have long since learned that anything trendy usually sucks, I was not expecting much from this book. Lieutenant Colonel Galula’s reputation, which I had believed before reading this book to have become somewhat over-inflated of late, was apparently well earned.

View all 3 comments. Aug 27, Nick Lloyd rated it really liked it Shelves: For a book written init really holds up. A bit oversimplified, but still a foundational work on counterinsurgency theory for good reason.

Mar 20, Teoh rated it it was amazing. This review of mine is qualified on the basis that I have never served in the armed forces in any capacity, much less participated as a civilian in a counterinsurgency campaign, or even experienced one beforehand.

Much of what I have to say are merely reflections of an amateur observer. Despite being a rather slim volume consisting of only pages, and reflecting upon a short time-span of counterinsurgency dating This review of mine is qualified on the basis that I have never served in the armed forces in any capacity, much less participated as a civilian in a counterinsurgency campaign, or even experienced one beforehand.

Despite being a rather slim volume consisting of only pages, and reflecting upon a short time-span of counterinsurgency dating from the end of WWII to the early 60s, this is a concisely-written book that can either be scoured in a day or contemplated in a week. Galula structured the book in such a way that a reader is first introduced to the “big picture” before being indoctrinated with the “devil in the details”. Has the book held up well since ? One of the more interesting chapters related to the insurgents’ doctrine, in particular what Galula describes as ‘Orthodox pattern’.

The former nation opted to go along with a military-backed, anti-Communist pogrom that consumed hundreds of thousands in lives.

While the latter, under the hands of its colonial master, settled instead for a politically-based, police-centric counterinsurgency against the guerillas. The results speaks for itself: But it is a high-stake gamble that may not be taken, for it seems to imply a high political cost for both U. It’s a lucid, engaging and clear book that in spite of being short, explains in a precise and detailed way the whole process of conformation and establishment of an armed insurgency and everything related to its natural reaction; the counterinsurgency.

It’s a book rich in historical examples that allows to understand several of the armed revolutions and the overthrow of governments, as well as their failures. This book is still in force despite having been written in the I’m actually surprised. This book is still in force despite having been written in the 60s, since the principles observed by the author have not changed much over the years. Jul 24, David rated it it was ok. This book is highly overrated.

Read Taber’s War of the Flea instead. Sure, it’s from the insurgent point of view, but you’ll learn far more there than you will here, because while the subtitle may be “Theory and Practice,” the truth of the matter is that there’s no real “practice” in this book.

Dec 12, Ayushman rated it it was amazing. Galula would’ve Jomini; but his work suffers from much of the same prescriptive weaknesses. Oct 18, prakash tripathi rated it it was amazing. One of the authentic and detailed exposition on the nature and cause of insurgency.

Jan 06, Leo rated it liked it. Competent, overarching foundational strategy of COIN. Dec 17, Jordan Balsamo rated it liked it. Dry and overly academic. Jan 03, Anthony rated it really liked it Recommends it for: This review has been hidden because it contains spoilers. To view it, click here. A testament to a book about military strategy is that it must stand the test of time. Galula’s observations and experiences of insurgencies in Algeria, Indochina, Greece, and China many decades ago have been translated into a clear, concise, quick to read guide about counterinsurgency that can be applied to conflicts today.

This work does well to explain insurgencies, how they form, how they gather strength, how the counter insurgent can respond, and ultimately defeat the insurgency. The theori A testament to a book about military strategy is that it must stand the test of time.

The theories in this work are not rocket science since many people must understand and work together to accomplish the different phases of counterinsurgency.

The difficult task is to establish a well thought out doctrine that all levels of leadership must understand and fully embrace.

This is not only military leadership from the generals to the privates, but also civilians put in charge of providing economic and social building blocks for the population under duress.

Emphasis has been placed on providing services for the population. If there is one thing to learn from the author it is that military might alone cannot defeat an insurgency and that ultimately it is the support of the population that will win the conflict.

The population must sympathize with counter insurgent’s cause and voluntarily provide information that will defeat the insurgency. One topic I found interesting in this book was the clear definition and separation of conventional versus revolutionary conflicts and the statement that all revolutionary conflicts, and therefore insurgencies are political in nature. Most importantly, if the counter insurgent wants to win the conflict, an alternative competing political platform must be provided or a current one reinforced for the population to choose.

The political movement of the masses must overwhelm the insurgencies political message. Military ventures against insurgents will ultimately fail if insurgents are still able to recruit new lackeys to their political cause.

Summary of “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice”

In fact, well written and directed propaganda is more useful that well directed bullets. Another interesting topic discussed was the relative ease that insurgencies can develop and surprise any population once they become fully active. One of Galula’s laws is, “In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause”.

This simple statement can be observed in many social causes today. Special interest groups, for good or bad, are able to push an agenda because of their aggressive propaganda and lobbying. I can definitely see how the complacency of the general population can let a political movement that may not be to its direct benefit progress. It is human nature and people are always busy with their own lives to worry about the rest.