Vladimir lenin and leon trotsky relationship questions

Leon Trotsky on Lenin | meer-bezoekers.info

Even after suffering a stroke, Lenin fought Stalin from the isolation of his bed. a world problem: What should be the relation of the new Russian state to These questions aren't new. . Enraged, Lenin tried to enlist his fellow revolutionary leader Leon Trotsky's support in his struggle against Stalin, but his. Leon Trotsky: On the Suppressed Testament of Lenin (December ) first appeared in the July and August, , issues of New International. . a split and from the point of view of the relation between Stalin and Trotsky. Vladimir Lenin spent most of the decade preceding the revolution Leon Trotsky had escaped from Siberian exile was to be found in offered poor people simplistic answers to complex questions. The Bolsheviks lied about the past — the relationships some of them had with the czarist police, Lenin's.

Petersburg, where he came into touch with the workers and began his propaganda work. These were passed from hand to hand in manuscript form. Soon after, Lenin started a theoretical struggle against the falsifiers of Marx, in the legal Press.

On his return to St. At this time,he married N. Krupskayahis comrade in the work of the St. Petersburg Union and his faithful companion during the remaining 26 years of his life and revolutionary struggle. During his exile he finished his most important economic work, The Development of Capitalism in Russia, based on a comprehensive and systematic study of an enormous mass of statistical material Lenin returned to Russia from Geneva, and already, in his first article, appealed to the Bolsheviks, in view of the new situation, to increase the scope of their organisation and to bring into the party wider circles of workers, but to preserve their illegal apparatus in anticipation of the counter-revolutionary blows which were inevitable.

Tsarism began to counter-attack. The rising in Moscow at the end of Dec. The suppression of the Dec. The Liberal bourgeoisie came to the front. The epoch of the first two Dumas began.

At this time, Lenin formulated the principles of the revolutionary exploitation of parliamentary methods in immediate connection with the struggle of the masses and as a means of preparation for a fresh attack. Now in began the epoch of victorious counter-revolution, prosecutions, exile, executions and emigration. In this dim epoch Lenin showed very vividly a combination of his two fundamental qualities—that of being an implacable revolutionary at bottom, while yet remaining a realist who made no mistakes in the choice of methods and means.

At the same time, Lenin carried on an extensive campaign against the attempt to revise the theoretic basis of Marxism on which his whole policy was founded. In he wrote a major treatise dealing with the fundamental questions of knowledge and directed against the essentially idealistic philosophy of MachAvenarius and their Russian followers, who tried to unite empiric criticism with Marxism.

On the basis of a deep and comprehensive study of science Lenin proved that the methods of dialectical materialism as formulated by Marx and Engels were entirely confirmed by the development of scientific thought in general and natural science in particular. For many years he had followed closely the internal affairs of the most important capitalist States. His realistic imagination and political intuition often enabled him to reconstruct a complete picture from isolated phenomena.

Lenin was always firmly opposed to the mechanical application of the methods of one country to another, and he investigated and decided questions concerning revolutionary movements, not only in their international interreactions, but also in their concrete national form. The revolution of Feb. His attempts to reach Russia met with the decided opposition of the British Government.

He accordingly decided to exploit the antagonism of the belligerent countries and to reach Russia through Germany. On the night of April 4, on leaving the train, Lenin made a speech in the Finlyandsky station in Petrograd. He repeated and developed the leading ideas it contained in the days which followed. The overthrow of Tsarism, he said, was only the first stage in the revolution.

The bourgeois revolution could no longer satisfy the masses. The task of the proletariat was to arm, to strengthen the power of the Soviets, to rouse the country districts and to prepare for the conquest of supreme power in the name of the reconstruction of society on a Socialist basis. This far-reaching programme was not only unwelcome to those engaged in propagating patriotic Socialism, but even roused opposition among the Bolsheviks themselves.

He foresaw that the distrust of the bourgeoisie and of the Provisional Government would grow stronger daily, that the Bolshevik party would obtain a majority in the Soviets and that the supreme power would pass into their hands. The small daily Pravda became at once in his hands a powerful instrument for the overthrow of bourgeois society.

The policy of coalition with the bourgeoisie pursued by the patriotic Socialists, and the hopeless attack which the Allies forced the Russian Army to assume at the front—both these roused the masses and led to armed demonstrations in Petrograd in the first days of July.

The struggle against Bolshevism became most intense. These purported to prove that Lenin was acting under the orders of the German general staff. The popular movement was crushed. The hounding of Lenin reached its height. The Bolsheviks obtained a majority in the Soviets of Petrograd and Moscow.

Lenin demanded decisive action to seize the supreme power, and on his side began an unremitting fight against the hesitations of the leaders of the party. He wrote articles and pamphlets, letters, both official and private, examining the question of the seizure of supreme power from every angle, refuting objections and dispelling doubts.

The rising against the Provisional Government coincided with the opening of the second Congress of the Soviets on Oct. On that day, Lenin, after being in hiding for three and a half months, appeared in the Smolny and from there personally directed the fight. The testament tries, incidentally, to forestall this danger, too.

Here is what it says immediately after its characterization of Stalin and Trotsky: This warning stands, however, in no relation with the remark about Trotsky.

In regard to him it is merely recommended not to use his non-Bolshevik past as an argument ad hominem. I therefore had no motive for putting the question which Radek attributes to me. Least of all did the testament set out to make a guiding role in the party work difficult for me. As we shall see below, it pursued an exactly opposite aim.

On the other side Lenin writes: Stalin, having become General Secretary, has concentrated an enormous power in his hands; and I am not sure that he always knows how to use this power with sufficient caution. The testament insists upon an increase of the number of members of the Central Committee to fifty, even to one hundred, in order that with this compact pressure it may restrain the centrifugal tendencies in the Political Bureau.

This organization proposal has still the appearance of a neutral guarantee against personal conflicts. But only ten days later it seemed to Lenin inadequate, and he added a supplementary proposal which also gave to the whole document its final physiognomy: I propose to the comrades to find a way to remove Stalin from that position and appoint to it another man who in all other respects [1] differs from Stalin only in superiority — namely; more patient, more loyal, more polite and more attentive to comrades, less capricious, etc.

During the days when the testament was dictated, Lenin was still trying to give to his critical appraisal of Stalin as restrained an expression as possible. In the coming weeks his tone would become sharper and sharper right up to the last hour when his voice ceased forever. But even in the testament enough is said to motivate the demand for a change of General Secretary: At this point the characterization becomes a heavy indictment.

As will appear later, the testament could not have been a surprise to Stalin. But this did not soften the blow. Upon his first acquaintance with the document, in the Secretariat, in the circle of his closest associates, Stalin let fly a phrase which gave quite unconcealed expression to his real feelings toward the author of the testament. The conditions under which this phrase spread to wide circles, and above all the inimitable quality of the reaction itself, is in my eyes an unqualified guarantee of the authenticity of the episode.

Unfortunately this winged phrase cannot be quoted in print. To remove Stalin — just him and him only — meant to cut him off from the apparatus, to withdraw from him the possibility of pressing on the long arm of the lever, to deprive him of all that power which he had concentrated in his hands in this office.

Who, then, should be named General Secretary? Someone who, having the positive qualities of Stalin, should be more patient, more loyal, less capricious. This was the phrase which struck home most sharply to Stalin. Lenin obviously did not consider him irreplaceable, since he proposed that we seek a more suitable person for his post.

In tendering his resignation, as a matter of form, the General Secretary capriciously kept repeating: Ilyich suggested that you find another who would differ from me only in greater politeness. Well, try to find him. Our whole party is rude, proletarian. As to the accusation of inadequate loyalty, neither Stalin nor his friends had a word to say. It is perhaps not without interest that the supporting voice came from A.

Politics knows no gratitude. Radek, who was then still a member of the Central Committee, sat beside me during the reading of the testament. The troika were compelled to forestall the possible effect of the testament by placing the party as soon as possible before a fait accompli. The leaders of the delegations in their reading would swallow some words, emphasize others, and offer commentaries to the effect that the letter had been written by a man seriously ill and under the influence of trickery and intrigue.

The machine was already in complete control. The mere fact that the troika was able to transgress the will of Lenin, refusing to read his letter at the Congress, sufficiently characterizes the composition of the Congress and its atmosphere. The testament did not weaken or put a stop to the inner struggle, but on the contrary lent it a disastrous tempo.

Stalin banishes Trotsky

It can press into its service even those who demonstratively turn their backs to it. But Ludwig means something more. He wants to suggest an exceptional closeness to the teacher of this particular pupil.

As an especially precious testimony Ludwig cites upon this point the words of Stalin himself: Ludwig becomes here a mere transmitter of the official legend manufactured during these recent years. I doubt if he has the remotest idea of the contradictions into which his indifference to facts has brought him. If Stalin actually was following Lenin up to his death, how then explain the fact that the last document dictated by Lenin, on the eve of his second stroke, was a curt letter to Stalin, a few lines in all, breaking off all personal and comradely relations?

Yet we hear not a word about this from Ludwig. As a matter of fact the testament, as also the letter breaking off relations, was written in those months December to the beginning of March during which Lenin in a series of programmatic articles gave the party the most mature fruits of his thinking. That break with Stalin did not drop out of a clear sky. It flowed from a long series of preceding conflicts, upon matters of principle and upon practical matters alike, and it sets forth the whole bitterness of these conflicts in a tragic light.

But Lenin was far from thinking that these gifts, even on an extraordinary scale, were sufficient for the leadership of the party and the state. Lenin saw in Stalin a revolutionist, but not a statesman in the grand style.

Theory had too high an importance for Lenin in a political struggle. Nobody considered Stalin a theoretician, and he himself up to never made any pretense to this vocation. On the contrary, his weak theoretical grounding was too well known in a small circle. Stalin is not acquainted with the West; he does not know any foreign language. And finally Stalin was not — this is less important, but not without significance — either a writer or an orator in the strict sense of the word.

But even here Lenin made substantial reservations, and these increased during the last period. Lenin despised idealistic moralizings. But this did not prevent him from being a rigorist of revolutionary morals — of those rules of conduct, that is, which he considered necessary for the success of the revolution and the creation of the new society.

He knew people too well and took them as they were. He would combine the faults of some with the virtues of others, and sometimes also with their faults, and never cease to watch keenly what came of it. He knew also that times change, and we with them. The party had risen with one jump from the underground to the height of power.

This created for each of the old revolutionists a startlingly sharp change in personal situation and in relations with others. What Lenin discovered in Stalin under these new conditions he cautiously but clearly remarked in his testament: Ludwig missed these hints. It is in them, however, that one can find the key to the relations between Lenin and Stalin in the last period.

Lenin was not only a theoretician and technician of the revolutionary dictatorship, but also a vigilant guardian of its moral foundations. Every hint at the use of power for personal interests kindled threatening fires in his eyes. And he would not infrequently add on the subject of parliamentarism one of his rich definitions. Stalin meanwhile was more and more broadly and indiscriminately using the possibilities of the revolutionary dictatorship for the recruiting of people personally obligated and devoted to him.

In his position as General Secretary he became the dispenser of favor and fortune. Here the foundation was laid for an inevitable conflict. Lenin gradually lost his moral trust in Stalin. If you understand that basic fact, then all the particular episodes of the last period take their places accordingly, and give a real and not a false picture of the attitude of Lenin to Stalin. Sverdlov and Stalin as Types of Organizers In order to accord the testament its proper place in the development of the party, it is here necessary to make a digression.

Up to the spring of the chief organizer of the party had been Sverdlov. He did not have the name of General Secretary, a name which was then not yet invented, but he was that in reality. Sverdlov died at the age of 34 in Marchfrom the so-called Spanish fever. In the spread of the civil war and the epidemic, mowing people down right and left, the party hardly realized the weight of this loss. In two funeral speeches Lenin gave an appraisal of Sverdlov which throws a reflected but very clear light also upon his later relations with Stalin.

His appraisal of Sverdlov was at the same time a characterization of the task of the organizer: Only thanks to the fact that we had such an organizer as Sverdlov were we able in war times to work as though we had not one single conflict worth speaking of. So it was in fact. In conversations with Lenin in those days we remarked more than once, and with ever renewed satisfaction, one of the chief conditions of our success: In spite of the dreadful pressure of events and difficulties, the novelty of the problems, and sharp practical disagreements occasionally bursting out, the work proceeded with extraordinary smoothness and friendliness, and without interruptions.

With a brief word we would recall episodes of the old revolutions. But in the inner mechanics of this unexampled unanimity the chief technician had been Sverdlov. The secret of his art was simple: No one of the party workers had any fear of intrigues creeping down from the party staff. The basis of this authority of Sverdlov was loyalty. Having tested out mentally all the party leaders, Lenin in his funeral speech drew the practical conclusion: Such a man we can never replace, if by replacement we mean the possibility of finding one comrade combining such qualities The work which he did alone can now be accomplished only by a whole group of men who, following in his footsteps, will carry on his service.

These words were not rhetorical, but a strictly practical proposal. And the proposal was carried out. Instead of a single Secretary, there was appointed a Collegium of three persons. From these words of Lenin it is evident, even to those unacquainted with the history of the party, that during the life of Sverdlov, Stalin played no leading role in the party machinery — either at the time of the October Revolution or in the period of laying the foundations and walls of the Soviet state.

Stalin was also not included in the first Secretariat which replaced Sverdlov. Perhaps also Lenin, like many others, did not adequately realize the danger in time. On December 7, in taking his departure upon the insistence of his physician, Lenin, little given to complaining, wrote to the members of the Political Bureau: I am leaving today.

In spite of my reduced quota of work and increased quota of rest, these last days the insomnia has increased devilishly. I am afraid I cannot speak either at the party Congress or the Soviet Congress. In May he has the first stroke.

For two months Lenin is unable to speak or write or move. In July he begins slowly to recover. Remaining in the country, he enters by degrees into active correspondence. In October he returns to the Kremlin and officially takes up his work. I formerly sat too steadily at my post and failed to observe many things; the long interruption has now permitted me to see much with fresh eyes.

What disturbed him most, unquestionably, was the monstrous growth of bureaucratic power, the focal point of which had become the Organization Bureau of the Central Committee. The necessity of removing the boss who was specializing in peppery dishes became clear to Lenin immediately after his return to work. But this personal question had become notably complicated. Lenin could not fail to see how extensively his absence had been made use of by Stalin for a one-sided selection of men — often in direct conflict with the interests of the cause.

The General Secretary was now relying upon a numerous faction, bound together by ties which, if not always intellectual, were at least firm. A change of the heads of the party machine had already become impossible without the preparation of a serious political attack.

The fact of this conversation as well as its content soon found their reflection in documents, and they constitute an episode of the party history undeniable and not denied by anyone.

Not only continual work, but also executive conversations with the comrades were again forbidden by his physicians. He had to think out further measures of struggle alone within four walls. To control the backstage activities of the Secretariat, Lenin worked out some general measures of an organizational character.

On January 23, through Krupskaya, Lenin sent for publication in Pravda an article on the subject of his proposed reorganization of the central institutions. Fearing at once a traitorous blow from his disease and a no less traitorous response from the Secretariat, Lenin demanded that his article be printed in Pravda immediately; this implied a direct appeal to the party. Stalin refused Krupskaya this request on the ground of the necessity of discussing the question in the Political Bureau.

But the very procedure of referring it to the Political Bureau boded no good. I demanded an immediate meeting of the Political Bureau. I rejected with indignation the proposal to hoodwink Lenin, spoke essentially in favor of the reform proposed by him, and demanded the immediate publication of his article. I was supported by Kamenev who had come in an hour late.

The attitude of the majority was at last broken down by the argument that Lenin in any case would put his article in circulation; it would be copied on typewriters, and read with redoubled attention, and it would be thus all the more pointedly directed against the Political Bureau. The article appeared in Pravda the next morning, January This episode also found its reflection in due season in official documents, upon the basis of which it is here described.

I consider it necessary in general to emphasize the fact that since I do not belong to the school of pure psychology, and since I am accustomed to trust firmly established facts rather than their emotional reflection in memory, the whole present exposition, with the exception of specially indicated episodes, is set forth by me on the basis of documents in my archives and with a careful verification of dates, testimony and factual circumstances in general.

The November Plenum of the Central Committeesitting without Lenin and without me, introduced unexpectedly a radical change in the system of foreign trade, undermining the very foundation of the state monopoly. On December 13 he wrote me: I earnestly urge you to take upon yourself at the coming Plenum the defense of our common view as to the unconditional necessity of preserving and enforcing the monopoly The previous Plenum took a decision in this matter wholly in conflict with monopoly of foreign trade.

Refusing any concessions upon this question; Lenin insisted that I appeal to the Central Committee and the Congress. The blow was directed primarily against Stalin, responsible as General Secretary for the presentation of questions at the Plenums of the Central Committee. That time, however, the thing did not go to the point of open struggle.

Leon Trotsky | Biography, Books, Assassination, & Facts | meer-bezoekers.info

Sensing the danger, Stalin yielded without a struggle, and his friends with him. At the December Plenum the November decision was revoked. The disagreement in the sphere of national policy was still sharper. In the autumn of we were preparing the transformation of the Soviet state into a federated union of national republics. Lenin considered it necessary to go as far as possible to meet the demands and claims of those nationalists who had long lived under oppression and were still far from recovering from its consequences.

Lenin, convalescing in a village near Moscow, carried on a polemic with Stalin in letters addressed to the Political Bureau. He was still hoping in those days — toward the end of September — to adjust the question through the Political Bureau and without open conflict. This correspondence, although extremely interesting politically, is still concealed from the party.

The bureaucratic national policy had already at that time provoked a keen opposition in Georgia, uniting against Stalin and his right hand man, Ordzhonikidze, the flower of Georgian Bolshevism.

Through Krupskaya, Lenin got into private contact with the leaders of the Georgian opposition Mdivani, Makharadze, etc. The struggle in the borderlands was too keen, and Stalin had bound himself too closely with definite groupings, to yield in silence as he had on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade. In the next few weeks Lenin became convinced that it would be necessary to appeal to the party. At the end of December he dictated a voluminous letter on the national question which was to take the place of his speech at the party Congress if illness prevented him from appearing.

Lenin employed against Stalin an accusation of administrative impulsiveness and spitefulness against an alleged nationalism.

He for the first time named his opponents by name: In mercilessly condemning the methods of the Stalin faction, Rakovsky wrote some years later: To the national question, as to all other questions, the bureaucracy makes its approach from the point of view of convenience of administration and regulation.

Nothing better could be said. He was ready to accept at the coming Congress any theoretical formulation of the national policy provided it did not weaken his factional support in the center and in the borderlands.

To be sure, Stalin had plenty of ground for fearing that Lenin saw through his plans completely. But on the other hand, the condition of the sick man was continually growing worse. Stalin coolly included this not unimportant factor in his calculations. Stalin tried to isolate the dangerous supervisor from all information which might give him a weapon against the Secretariat and its allies.

This policy of blockade naturally was directed against the people closest to Lenin. Krupskaya did what she could to protect the sick man from contact with the hostile machinations of the Secretariat.

But Lenin knew how to guess a whole situation from accidental symptoms. He was clearly aware of the activities of Stalin, his motives and calculations. It is not difficult to imagine what reactions they provoked in his mind. On March 4,Pravda published an article famous in the history of the party, Better Less but Better. This work was written at several different times. Lenin did not like to, and could not dictate.

He had a hard time writing the article. On March 2 he finally listened to it with satisfaction: Upon this side of the question, however, we cannot pause here. Let us speak frankly. Everybody knows that a worse organized institution than our Commissariat of Rabkrin does not exist, and that in the present circumstances you cannot expect a thing of that Commissariat.

This extraordinarily biting allusion in print by the head of the government to one of the most important state institutions was a direct and unmitigated blow against Stalin as the organizer and head of this Inspection. The reason for this should now be clear. The Inspection was to serve chiefly as an antidote to bureaucratic distortions of the revolutionary dictatorship.

This responsible function could be fulfilled successfully upon condition of complete loyalty in its leadership, but it was just this loyalty which Stalin lacked. Let us recall once more the principal dates. In September Lenin opened fire against the national policy of Stalin. In the first part of December he attacked Stalin on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade. On December 25 he wrote the first part of his testament. On January 4,he added a postscript to his testament on the necessity of removing Stalin from his position as General Secretary.

On January 23 he drew up against Stalin a heavy battery: In an article on March 2 he dealt Stalin a double blow, both as organizer of the Inspection and as General Secretary. On March 5 he wrote me on the subject of his memorandum on the national question: Under pretext of the necessity of finding out the actual will of Lenin, it was decided to put the letter under lock and key.

There it remains to this day. The dramatic episodes enumerated above, vivid enough in themselves, do not in the remotest degree convey the fervor with which Lenin was living through the party events of the last months of his active life. In letters and articles he laid upon himself the usual very severe censorship. Lenin understood well enough from his first stroke the nature of his illness. After he returned to work in October the capillary vessels of his brain did not cease to remind him of themselves by a hardly noticeable, but ominous and more and more frequent nudge, obviously threatening a relapse.

Lenin soberly estimated his own situation in spite of the quieting assurances of his physicians. At the beginning of March, when he was compelled again to withdraw from work, at least from meetings, interviews and telephone conversations, he carried away into his sick room a number of troubling observations and dreads. In the national sphere, where Lenin demanded special sensitiveness, the fangs of imperial centralism were revealing themselves more and more openly.

The ideas and principles of the revolution were bending to the interests of combinations behind the scenes. The authority of the dictatorship was more and more often serving as a cover for the dictations of functionaries. Lenin keenly sensed the approach of a political crisis, and feared that the apparatus would strangle the party.

The policies of Stalin became for Lenin in the last period of his life the incarnation of a rising monster of bureaucratism. The sick man must more than once have shuddered at the thought that he had not succeeded in carrying out that reform of the apparatus about which he had talked with me before his second illness.

A terrible danger, it seemed to him, threatened the work of his whole life. Having gone too far to retreat, spurred on by his own faction, fearing that concentrated attack whose threads all issued from the sickbed of his dread enemy, Stalin was already going headlong, was openly recruiting partisans by the distribution of party and Soviet positions, was terrorizing those who appealed to Lenin through Krupskaya, and was more and more persistently issuing rumors that Lenin was already not responsible for his actions.

No, it did not drop from a clear sky. It meant merely that the cup of endurance had run over. Not only chronologically, but politically and morally, it drew a last line under the attitude of Lenin to Stalin.

Ludwig ought at least to know the fact of the letter, if only from my autobiography, with which he was once acquainted, for he gave it a favorable review. Maybe Ludwig had doubts of the authenticity of my testimony. But neither the existence of the letter nor its contents were ever disputed by anybody. More over, they are confirmed in stenographic minutes of the Central Committee. At the July Plenum inZinoviev said: At the beginning of the yearVladimir Ilyich, in a personal letter to Comrade Stalin, broke off all comradely relations with him.

Stenographic Minutes of the Plenum, No. And other speakers, among them M. Indeed, he has not ventured to do that so far as I know, in a direct form, even subsequently. It is true that the official historians have in recent years made literally gigantic efforts to wipe out of the memory of man this whole chapter of history.

And so far as the Communist youth are concerned, these efforts have achieved certain results. But investigators exist, it would seem, exactly for the purpose of destroying legends and confirming the real facts in their rights. Or is this not true of psychologists?

At all these stages Lenin sought my support and found it. From the speeches, articles and letters of Lenin you could without difficulty adduce dozens of testimonies to the fact that, after our temporary disagreement on the question of the trade unions, throughout and and the beginning ofLenin did not lose one chance to emphasize in open forum his solidarity with me, to quote this or that statement from me, to support this or that step which I had taken.

We must understand that his motives were not personal, but political. What may have alarmed him and grieved him in the last months, indeed, was my not-active-enough support of his fighting measures against Stalin. Yes, such is the paradox of the situation!